Strategic Exploitation of a Common Resource under Environmental Risk by Fesselmeyer, Eric & Santugini, Marc
      
Fesselmeyer: Department of Economics, National University of Singapore, Singapore 
ecsef@nus.edu.sg 
Santugini: Institute of Applied Economics and CIRPÉE, HEC Montréal, Canada 
marc.santugini@hec.ca 
 
 
 
 
Cahier de recherche/Working Paper 11-31 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Exploitation of a Common Resource under Environmental Risk 
 
 
Eric Fesselmeyer 
Marc Santugini 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Première version/First Version : Octobre/October 2011 
Version révisée/Revised : Novembre/November 2012 
Abstract:  
We study the effect of environmental risk on the extraction of a common resource. Using 
a dynamic and non-cooperative game in which an environmental event impacts the 
renewability and the quality of the resource, we show that the anticipation of such an 
event has an ambiguous effect on extraction and the tragedy of the commons. A risk of 
a reduction in the renewability induces the agents to extract less today while a risk of a 
deterioration in the quality has the opposite effect. Moreover, when environmental risk 
induces conservation, the tragedy of the commons is worsened. 
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1 Introduction
Natural common resources are susceptible to increasing environmental risks
as reported in recent scientiﬁc studies. The most common prediction is a
widespread reduction in the renewability (i.e., the future quantity) of the
stock of natural resources. Declining ﬁsh stocks (Backlund et al., 2008);
a decrease in global water availability (IPPC, 2007); an overall decline in
crop yields for global temperature increases above 3 ◦C (IPPC, 2007); and
a decrease in growth rates of tropical forests (Hopkin, 2007) are just a few
examples. There is also scientiﬁc evidence regarding the negative eﬀect of
climate changes on the quality of natural resources. The US Department of
Agriculture reports that an increase in extreme events brought on by climate
changes, such as more frequent ﬂooding, will reduce water quality (Backlund
et al., 2008).1
Complementary to the scientiﬁc research, there exists a large literature
in economics that asks how economic behavior is altered in anticipation of
events that have detrimental eﬀects on natural resources.2 While many pa-
pers have found conservative behavior in the context of single-agent dynamic
models, less is known about the link between conservative behavior and the
tragedy of the commons. Speciﬁcally, there remains the question of whether
the intensity of conservation diﬀers in the non-cooperative outcome and the
social planner’s solution and if so, what the eﬀect is on the tragedy of the
commons.3
It is the purpose of this paper to consider whether the tragedy of the com-
mons is reduced or exacerbated in the presence of environmental risk. To
1Additionally, if we consider the resource at the aggregate level, then a decrease in the
variety of species can be interpreted as a decrease in quality. Such a reduction in variety
has the potential to be widespread as 30% of species are at an increasing risk of extinction
(Kerr, 2007).
2See among others: Reed (1993), Clarke and Reed (1994), Tsur and Zemel (1995, 1996,
1998), Laﬀorgue (2005), Alvarez and Koskela (2006), Mitra and Roy (2006), and Polasky
et al. (2011).
3The issue of whether increased uncertainty leads to more or less conservation has also
been studied in the context of technology adoption. For instance, Just et al. (2005) consid-
ers the adoption of an existing backstop technology in problems of exhaustible resources
when the discovery of superior technologies is anticipated. Delay in adopting the backstop
technology would cause the resource to be depleted more rapidly.
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that end, we embed environmental risk in a dynamic and non-cooperative
extraction game a` la Levhari and Mirman (1980) and show that strategic
interactions are key in explaining the eﬀect of environmental risk on the
tragedy of the commons. We focus on two eﬀects of environmental risk con-
sistent with the scientiﬁc evidence exposed above: renewability and quality.
We consider a purely exogenous risk, i.e., the exploitation of a lone resource
has a relatively small eﬀect on regional or global environmental risk.4 This
is in contrast to a strand of the literature on (single-agent) optimal con-
trol which considers the problem of resource management under uncertainty
when the agent can reduce the likelihood of the environmental risk (Clarke
and Reed (1994), Tsur and Zemel (1995), Tsur and Zemel (1996), Tsur and
Zemel (1998)). Speciﬁcally, Tsur and Zemel (1995) study the management of
groundwater resources at risk of a permanent and catastrophic event (ceasing
exploitation activity).5 Optimal exploitation is also studied in the context of
managing the level of pollution in the case of environmental events (Clarke
and Reed (1994), Tsur and Zemel (1996), Tsur and Zemel (1998)).6 In all
these cases, conservation can occur to prevent or reduce the likelihood of such
events. In contrast, by focusing on a completely exogenous event, the change
in behavior is solely due to reducing exposure to risk (instead of altering it).7
Hence, we are able to provide results about the pure eﬀect of environmental
risk, thereby abstracting from any manipulation by the agents.8
4Exogenous uncertainty has also been studied extensively in models of resource extrac-
tion under ownership risk or weak property rights (Long (1975), Bohn and Deacon (2000),
Laurent-Lucchetti and Santugini (2012)).
5In that vein, see Aﬂaki (2010) for a recent working paper regarding the eﬀect of un-
certainty on the tragedy of the commons in a non-dynamic context. In Aﬂaki (2010),
individuals have an eﬀect on the likelihood of the risk, in the sense that too much ex-
ploitation destroys the resource.
6Clarke and Reed (1994) consider the case in which the likelihood of the environmental
change depends on the level of pollution, while Tsur and Zemel (1996, 1998) assume that
the occurrence of the event depends on the pollution history.
7See also Polasky et al. (2011) for a recent study that combines the case of catastrophic
stock collapse with changes in the system dynamics (as in our paper) in the context of
a single-agent problem. Conservative behavior prevails whether the risk is exogenous or
endogenous.
8The eﬀect of exogenous uncertainty (not necessarily related to environmental risk)
has been studied in single-agent dynamic problems (Mirman and Spulber (1984), Feliz
(1993), Epstein (1996), Mitra and Roy (2006)), as well as dynamic games with strategic
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We ﬁrst show that when the environment becomes riskier, harvesting
behavior is altered in order to reduce exposure to risk.9 On the one hand, if
environmental changes lead only to a lower renewability, agents reduce their
exposure to this type of risk by harvesting less. The substitution toward
future harvesting (and, thus, consumption) is due to precautionary motives
since saving more allows one to compensate for a possibly less renewable
resource and less future availability of the stock. On the other hand, if
environmental changes lead only to lower quality, then agents reduce their
exposure to risk by harvesting and consuming more in the present so as to face
less risk in terms of future utility ﬂows. When both quality and renewability
are at risk of being deteriorated, the direction of the eﬀect depends on the
relative strength of the two eﬀects. For instance, if the deterioration in
quality is small compared to the negative change in renewability, then agents
reduce their exposure to risk by harvesting less. In that case, precautionary
motives dominate over concerns for lower future (per-unit) utility ﬂows.
In view of our results, the reason for a change in behavior due to environ-
mental risk is solely motivated by a reduction in the exposure to risk (and
not manipulation of likelihood of risk as discussed above). In that sense, our
framework is close to Laﬀorgue (2005), which provides such an analysis in
the context of a single-agent optimal control problem of resource extraction
when there is amenity value for the exploited stock. The eﬀect of uncertainty
is shown to be ambiguous as well, and can lead to conservation. However,
the overall eﬀect depends on the size of uncertainty and not the type of
uncertainty, as in our paper (i.e., quality vs. renewability uncertainty).
After explaining how diﬀerent types of risk aﬀect harvesting, we turn
to the tragedy of the commons. We show that when environmental risk
induces conservation (i.e., when the risk of less renewability is more impor-
tant than the risk of quality deterioration), the presence of the risk leads
behavior (Amir (1996), Laukkanen (2003), Antoniadou et al. (2007), Wang and Ewald
(2010)). In these studies, the evolution of the stock depends on random shocks, while, in
our approach, the source of uncertainty is the timing of an environmental event that leads
to permanent changes in the characteristics of the natural resource.
9See Alvarez and Koskela (2006) and Reed (1993) for the issue of risk exposure and
risk aversion in the context of forest management.
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to a stronger decrease in present harvesting under social planning than in
the non-cooperative game. Hence, the ratio between aggregate harvesting
in the Cournot-Nash outcome and the socially optimal level of harvesting is
increased, which makes the tragedy of the commons worse. Although agents
choose to harvest less, they do not internalize the risk that too much extrac-
tion creates for others, and, thus, decrease their own extraction too little.
The social planner, on the other hand, internalizes this eﬀect and decreases
harvesting more. This disparity in conservation leads to a worsening of the
tragedy of the commons. We also show that when the risk of quality deteri-
oration is the greatest of both risks, a larger stock means more uncertainty
regarding future utility ﬂows. In the non-cooperative game, the agents only
care about their own exposure to risk without considering the overall risk in
terms of future utility ﬂows, which leads to a weaker increase in harvesting
relative to the social planner. As a result, the tragedy of the commons is less-
ened because the agents fail to reduce exposure to risk in a socially optimal
way.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present
the model. In Section 3, we characterize the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and
the benchmark socially optimal solution. We then study the eﬀect of envi-
ronmental risk on behavior and the tragedy of the commons in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes and suggests possible extensions.
2 The Model
In this section, we embed environmental risk in the Great Fish War dy-
namic game of Levhari and Mirman (1980). We ﬁrst recall the benchmark
set-up and provide an interpretation of the parameters characterizing the re-
source. We then introduce environmental risk by rendering these parameters
stochastic.
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2.1 Benchmark Set Up: No Environmental Risk
Consider the Great Fish War dynamic game in which several agents derive
utility from the consumption of a common and renewable resource.10 For-
mally, let yt be the stock of the resource available at the beginning of period
t. If the resource were to go unexploited in period t, the stock would evolve
at the beginning of period t + 1 according to the biological rule
yt+1 = y
α
t , (1)
where α ∈ (0, 1]. We assume that the stock is initially below the carrying
capacity, i.e., y0 < 1.
During period t, agent j extracts a quantity cj,t from the stock yt, which
yields utility u(cj,t, ϕ) = ϕ ln cj,t with ϕ > 0.
11 The present consumption of
the resource by the N agents has an eﬀect on the future stock. Using (1),
the evolution of the resource follows the rule
yt+1 =
(
yt −
∑N
j=1
cj,t
)α
, (2)
where a total of
∑N
j=1 cj,t is consumed in period t and the remaining yt −∑N
j=1 cj,t is left to yield the stock yt+1 at the beginning of period t + 1. In
the standard set up, both parameters ϕ and α are known and constant over
time.
Before embedding environmental risk in the Great Fish War game, we
interpret the parameters ϕ and α in the deterministic case. Consider ﬁrst
parameter ϕ. Remark 2.1 states that a higher value of ϕ reﬂects a higher
quality of the resource.
Remark 2.1. For u(cj,t, ϕ) = ϕ ln cj,t, an increase in ϕ unambiguously in-
10Pertinent resources include not only the stock of ﬁsh in the ocean, but also the stock
of wood in the forest, or the stock of potable water in rivers and lakes. Moreover, the
resource may refer to the overall industry, e.g., ﬁsh can refer to all species of ﬁsh, or it
may refer to a speciﬁc area of the industry, e.g., tuna ﬁshing.
11In Levhari and Mirman (1980), the parameter ϕ is normalized to one since a multi-
plicative term in the utility function has no eﬀect on behavior in the deterministic case.
This parameter will play a role when we introduce environmental risk.
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creases both the utility and the marginal utility of consumption.
Consider next the parameter α. We show in Appendix A that when the
stock is less than the carrying capacity, i.e., when yt < 1, an increase in α
at time t leads to an immediate and permanent decrease in the stock of the
resource. That is, ∂yk
∂α
< 0 for all k > t. Remark 2.2 states the negative eﬀect
of α on availability.12
Remark 2.2. Given (2), when the stock is less than the carrying capacity,
an increase in α in period t permanently reduces the future availability of an
exploited resource in period t+ 1 and onward.
2.2 Environmental Risk
Having interpreted the relevant parameters of the model, we next introduce
environmental risk. To that end, resource characteristics ϕ and α (quality
and availability) now depend on the state of the environment st in the fol-
lowing way. For state of the environment st, the resource available at the
beginning of period t is determined by
yt =
(
yt−1 −
∑N
j=1
cj,t−1
)αst
, (3)
and extracting cj,t units during period t yields utility u(cj,t, ϕst) = ϕst ln cj,t
to agent j.
We adopt a simple process for st. There are two possible states: st ∈
{1, 2}. State 1 represents the environment prior to an event that alters the
natural resource negatively and permanently. State 2 represents the new
environment immediately following this event. The probability of a change
in resource characteristics is ρ ∈ (0, 1]. In other words, if the state of the
environment is st = 1 in period t, then there is a probability ρ of a permanent
change in the subsequent period to state st+1 = 2. Assumption 2.3 holds for
the remainder of the paper.
12If the stock is greater than the carrying capacity, then an increase in α initially in-
creases renewability before the eﬀect turns negative. We disregard this case as in the long
run the stock will be below the carrying capacity and Remark 2.2 applies.
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Assumption 2.3. Pr[st+1 = 2|st = 1] = ρ and Pr[st+1 = 2|st = 2] = 1.
Assumption 2.3 implies that a change is inevitable.13 We abstract from
asymmetric information and learning by assuming that the probability ρ is
known. Here, the parameter ρ represents the common beliefs held by the
economy regarding the occurrence of an environmental change. Finally, ρ
is exogenous: the extraction activity of the resource has a negligible eﬀect
on environmental risk. In other words, the agents exploiting the resource
inﬂuence neither the likelihood of the environmental event nor the nature of
the change. One example for which this is a reasonable framework is the
potential shutdown of the thermohaline circulation, which would negatively
and permanently impact stocks of ﬁsh in the North Atlantic Ocean. Fishing,
however, has no known eﬀect on this risk.14
We now describe the eﬀect of an environmental change on the resource
characteristics.
Assumption 2.4. ϕ1 ≥ ϕ2 and α1 ≤ α2 and at least one inequality holds
strictly.
Given the interpretation of the parameters discussed previously and in
Appendix A, Assumption 2.4 is consistent with the scientiﬁc evidence ex-
posed in the introduction. Indeed, the eﬀect of an environmental event on
resource characteristics can be two-fold. First, the environmental change
may reduce the quality of the resource: ϕ1 > ϕ2. Second, a change in the
environment may decrease the future availability of the resource: α1 < α2.
15
Throughout the rest of the paper we consider environmental events which
cause just one of these changes but also the more general case in which both
changes are possible.
13The probability of being in state 1 in period t is the probability that the characteristics
of the resource have not changed in the previous t periods, i.e., Pr[st = 1] = (1−ρ)t. Hence,
limt→∞ Pr[st = 2] = limt→∞ 1− (1− ρ)t = 1.
14We thank a referee for this example.
15Note that in this case it is necessary to add the restriction α1 < 1.
9
3 Non-Cooperation vs. Cooperation
In this section, we consider behavior under both non-cooperation and coop-
eration. In the subsequent section, we study the eﬀect of environmental risk
on the two outcomes as well as on the tragedy of the commons (by comparing
the two outcomes).
Since we restrict attention to stationary Markovian strategies, the prob-
lem is time-independent and the subscript t is dropped hereafter. A hat sign
is used instead to mark time. Speciﬁcally, s and sˆ represent the state of
the environment (and, thus, the characteristics of the resource) today and
tomorrow, respectively. Similarly, y and yˆ =
(
y −∑Nj=1 cj)αˆ refer to the
resource stock today and tomorrow, respectively.
3.1 Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
Under non-cooperation, each agent maximizes the expected sum of discounted
utilities over consumption. The agents anticipate the eﬀect of their own
present consumption decision as well as the eﬀect of the other agents’ con-
sumption decisions on the future stock of the resource. Moreover, each agent
anticipates the possibility of a permanent change in resource characteristics.
Speciﬁcally, in the general case, each agent is faced with uncertainty about
the quality of the resource and the growth of the stock at the beginning of
period t + 1. Therefore, given the stock y, the stock dynamics (eq. 3), and
the stochastic process deﬁned in Assumption 2.3, the value function of agent
i when the environment is in state 1 satisﬁes
V CN1 (y) = max
0≤ci≤y−
∑
j =i cj
ϕ1 ln ci + (1− ρ)δV CN1
((
y − ci −
∑
j =i
cj
)α1)
+ ρδV CN2
((
y − ci −
∑
j =i
cj
)α2)
, (4)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and V CNs is the value function in a
Cournot-Nash (CN) environment when the environment is in state s.
In eq. (4), agent i anticipates a possible change in the resource charac-
teristics in the beginning of the subsequent period. With probability 1 − ρ,
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the characteristics remains the same, i.e., s = sˆ = 1, yielding a stock yˆ =
(y −∑Nj=1 cj)α1 of quality ϕ1 in the subsequent period. With probability ρ,
the characteristics change permanently, yielding a stock yˆ = (y−∑Nj=1 cj)α2
of quality ϕ2. Once the environmental change occurs, there are no more
anticipated changes. In other words,
V CN2 (y) = max
0≤ci≤y−
∑
j =i cj
ϕ2 ln ci + δV
CN
2
((
y − ci −
∑
j =i
cj
)α2)
, (5)
for any level y > 0 of the stock.16
We characterize the agents’ equilibrium behavior prior to the environmen-
tal change. Proposition 3.1 contains the symmetric Cournot-Nash solution
corresponding to eq. (4), denoted by gCN(y). The proof is relegated to Ap-
pendix B.17
Proposition 3.1. There exists a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium to (4).
In equilibrium, each agent consumes
gCN(y) =
ϕ1y
Nϕ1 +
(1− ρ)δα1ϕ1 + ρ δα2ϕ2
1− δα2
1− (1− ρ)δα1
. (6)
We now perform a comparative analysis of the parameters of the model
on optimal behavior. Speciﬁcally, we study the eﬀects of α1, α2, ϕ1, and ϕ2
on gCN(y). A discussion of the eﬀect of ρ on optimal behavior is postponed
to Section 4. Consider the ﬁrst-order condition
ϕ1
c
= δ(1− ρ) α1
1 − (1− ρ)α1δ
ϕ1 + δρ
ϕ2α2
1− α2δ
y −Nc + δρ
ϕ2α2
1− α2δ
y −Nc (7)
corresponding to eq. (6). Each agent’s optimal consumption equates the
marginal utility of consumption with the expected marginal utility of non-
harvest, i.e., the marginal utility of consuming one unit less of the resource
16If ρ were equal to 0, then expressions (4) and (5) would be identical.
17Formally, the stationary Markovian strategy proﬁle {gCN(y)}Nj=1 is a symmetric
Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium.
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today. The right-hand side of (7) has two components. The ﬁrst term repre-
sents the marginal utility of non-harvest conditional on the resource charac-
teristics remaining the same for at least one more period and taking account
of a possible environmental change later on. The second term represents the
marginal utility of non-harvest conditional on an environmental change in
the subsequent period leading to an irreversible change in the evolution and
quality of the resource. Both terms are discounted by δ and weighted by the
probability of each event.
First, consider the renewability parameters in (7). An increase in either
α1 and α2 decreases the renewability of the resource, which increases the
expected marginal utility of non-harvest and causes present consumption to
decrease. Second, from (7), an increase in the quality parameter prior to
the environmental change, ϕ1, has a positive eﬀect on both the marginal
utility of consumption and the marginal utility of non-harvest (because the
environmental change may not occur in the next period). The eﬀect on the
marginal utility of consumption is the strongest of the two, which increases
present consumption. Finally, an increase in ϕ2 unambiguously increases the
expected marginal utility of non-harvest in (7) due to the increase in the
quality of future consumption, which reduces present consumption.18
3.2 Social Planner’s Problem
We now turn to the social planner’s problem. The objective of the social
planner is to maximize the discounted sum of all agents’ utilities. Unlike an
agent in the Cournot-Nash environment, the social planner internalizes the
eﬀect of each agent’s consumption on the reduction of the common natural
18Note that the eﬀects for ϕ1 and ϕ2 pull in opposite directions in equal strength, i.e.,
∂gCN(y)/∂ϕ1+∂g
CN(y)/∂ϕ2 = 0. In other words, if ϕ ≡ ϕ1 = ϕ2, then ∂gCN(y)/∂ϕ = 0.
Hence, the multiplicative taste parameter has an impact on optimal behavior only when
it depends on the environment.
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resource. Formally, the value function of the social planner satisﬁes
V SP1 (y) = max
c1,...,cN
N∑
j=1
ϕ1 ln cj + (1− ρ)δV SP1
((
y −
∑N
j=1
cj
)α1)
+ ρδV SP2
((
y −
∑N
j=1
cj
)α2)
, (8)
subject to 0 ≤ ∑Nj=1 cj ≤ y. Here, V SPs is the social planner’s (SP ) value
function when the environment is in state s. The value function after the
environmental change satisﬁes
V SP2 (y) = max
c1,...,cN
∑N
j=1
ϕ2 ln cj + δV
SP
2
((
y −
∑N
j=1
cj
)α2)
, (9)
subject to 0 ≤∑Nj=1 cj ≤ y, for any y > 0.
Proposition 3.2 states the per-agent symmetric social planner’s solution
corresponding to eq. (8), denoted by gSP (y), The proof is relegated to Ap-
pendix B.
Proposition 3.2. There exists a unique solution to (8), in which each agent
consumes
gSP (y) =
ϕ1y
N
⎛
⎜⎜⎝ϕ1 + (1− ρ)δα1ϕ1 + ρ
δα2ϕ2
1− δα2
1− (1− ρ)δα1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
. (10)
We consider again the eﬀect of α1, α2, ϕ1, and ϕ2 on the consumption of
the social planner, gSP (y), using the ﬁrst-order condition
ϕ1
c
= Nδ(1− ρ) α1
1− (1− ρ)α1δ
ϕ1 + δρ
ϕ2α2
1− α2δ
y −Nc +Nδρ
ϕ2α2
1− α2δ
y −Nc (11)
corresponding to eq. (10). Similar to (7), the social planner’s optimal choice
equates the marginal utility of consumption with the marginal utility of non-
harvest, which in this case, internalizes the dynamic externality. In partic-
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ular, notice that expressions (7) and (11) diﬀer by a multiple of N in the
right-hand side. Therefore, the directions of the eﬀects of the renewabil-
ity and quality parameters on consumption under the social planner are the
same as in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium discussed at the end of Section
3.1. Lower renewability, i.e., higher α1 or α2, decreases present consump-
tion. An increase in initial quality, ϕ1, increases present consumption, while
an increase in quality after the environmental change, ϕ2, decreases present
consumption.
4 The Eﬀect of Environmental Risk on the
Tragedy of the Commons
In this section, we study the eﬀect of environmental risk on the tragedy of the
commons. To that end, using Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, we study the eﬀect
of a riskier environment on g
CN (y)
gSP (y)
> 1, the ratio between total harvesting in
a non-cooperative game and the socially optimal level of harvesting.
In order to clarify the discussion, we proceed in three steps. We ﬁrst
consider the case in which the environmental change leads only to lower
renewability, i.e., ϕ1 = ϕ2 and α1 < α2. We then consider the case in which
only quality deteriorates, i.e., ϕ1 > ϕ2 and α1 = α2. Finally, we allow for
both types of changes and provide general conditions for which the tragedy of
the commons increases or decreases as the environment becomes riskier. In all
cases, when the environment becomes riskier, harvesting behavior is altered
to reduce exposure to the risk. The direction of these changes depends on
the nature of the environmental change. Additionally, strategic interactions
render the changes in behavior weaker (relative to the behavior of the social
planner), which explains the changes in the magnitude of the tragedy of the
commons.
Proposition 4.1 states that, while a higher likelihood of a less renewable
resource entails more conservative behavior, it also exacerbates the tragedy
of the commons. The proof is relegated to Appendix B.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that ϕ1 = ϕ2 and α1 < α2. Then,
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1.
∂gCN (y)
∂ρ
,
∂gSP (y)
∂ρ
< 0, and
2.
gCN(y)
gSP (y)
is strictly increasing in ρ.
The ﬁrst result of Proposition 4.1 states that, if environmental changes
lead only to lower renewability, agents reduce their exposure to this type
of risk by harvesting less. The substitution toward future harvesting (and,
thus, future consumption) is due to precautionary motives since saving more
allows one to compensate for a possibly less renewable resource and less
future availability of the stock. Note that the risk of having a less renewable
resource induces more conservation in both the non-cooperative game and
under social planning.
The second result in Proposition 4.1 concerns the tragedy of the commons.
It states that the ratio of the Cournot-Nash outcome to the social planner’s
solution increases as the risk of a change in renewability becomes greater.
In other words, when environmental risk induces conservation, the tragedy
of the commons increases. The reason is as follows. When environmental
changes lead only to a lower renewability, agents reduce their exposure to
risk by harvesting less. They do not, however, internalize the risk that their
extraction creates for others and, thus, decrease their own extraction too
little. The social planner does internalize the eﬀect of conservation on all
agents, and decreases harvesting more than in the non-cooperative game,
which reduces the risk for the whole group of agents. This disparity in
conservation leads to a worsening of the tragedy of the commons in addition
to overexposure to the risk of less renewability in the non-cooperative game.
Next, we turn to the case in which the only risk is a possible deterioration
in quality. Proposition 4.2 states that, while a higher likelihood of a resource
yielding lower quality entails less conservative behavior, it also mitigates the
tragedy of the commons. The proof is relegated to Appendix B.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that ϕ1 > ϕ2 and α1 = α2. Then,
1.
∂gCN (y)
∂ρ
,
∂gSP (y)
∂ρ
> 0, and
15
2.
gCN(y)
gSP (y)
is strictly decreasing in ρ.
The ﬁrst result of Proposition 4.2 states that, if environmental changes
lead only to lower quality, then agents reduce their exposure to risk by har-
vesting more in the present so as to face less risk in terms of future utility
ﬂows. Indeed, under a risk of quality deterioration, a larger stock implies
more uncertainty regarding future utility ﬂows. In that case, harvesting
more implies a reduction in risk exposure.
The second result in Proposition 4.2 concerns the tragedy of the commons.
In the non-cooperative game, when the only risk is quality deterioration, each
agent engages in more harvesting. As the agents care only about their own
exposure to risk and do not consider the overall risk in terms of future utility
ﬂows via the size of the stock, harvesting is increased too little relative to
the social planner, who internalizes this externality. As a result, the tragedy
of the commons is mitigated. While the socially suboptimal reaction in the
non-cooperative game (in terms of the level of risk) turns out to be beneﬁcial
from the vantage point of the tragedy of the commons, it is still the case that
agents in the non-cooperative game are exposed to a level of risk that is too
high compared to the socially optimal level of risk.
In view of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, the overall eﬀect of both a dete-
rioration in renewability and the quality of the resource, i.e., α1 < α2 and
ϕ1 > ϕ2, is ambiguous since the two eﬀects pull in opposite directions. Hence,
the direction of the eﬀect depends on the relative strength of the two eﬀects.
Proposition 4.3 provides a general condition for which the tragedy of the
commons increases or decreases as the environment becomes riskier. The
proof is relegated to Appendix B.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose that ϕ1 > ϕ2 and α1 < α2. Then,
α2ϕ2
1− δα2 >
α1ϕ1
1− δα1 (12)
implies that
1.
∂gCN (y)
∂ρ
,
∂gSP (y)
∂ρ
< 0, and
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2.
gCN(y)
gSP (y)
is strictly increasing in ρ.
We now interpret condition (12) by comparing the marginal utility of non-
harvest in the ﬁrst-order condition of the Cournot-Nash game, (7), with the
one in the ﬁrst-order condition of the social-planner’s problem, (11), which we
denote MUNHCN and MUNHSP . First, we note that when condition (12)
holds, MUNHCN increases in the probability of an environmental change:
∂MUNHCN
∂ρ
=
δ
y −Nc
1− δα1
(1− (1− ρ) δα1)2
(
ϕ2α2
1− δα2 −
ϕ1α1
1− δα1
)
> 0. (13)
That is, as ρ increases, the marginal utility of non-harvest increases, caus-
ing present consumption to decrease. Second, since MUNHSP = N ×
MUNHCN , any change in Cournot-Nash behavior is magniﬁed under the
social planner. In other words, when consumption decreases in the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium, it decreases even more under the social planner leading to
a worsening of the tragedy of the commons.
We can now interpret condition (12) by examining how the relative values
of ϕ1 and ϕ2 and of α1 and α2 aﬀect the marginal utilities of non-harvest
and the tragedy of the commons. To that end, we rearrange condition (12)
as
α2
1−δα2
α1
1−δα1︸ ︷︷ ︸
renewability
× ϕ2
ϕ1︸︷︷︸
quality
> 1. (14)
When the value of α2 increases relative to α1, the renewability ratio increases,
and the positive eﬀect of ρ on MUNHCH increases:
∂2MUNHCH
∂ρ∂α2
∣∣∣
ϕ1=ϕ2
> 0 (15)
In this case, precautionary savings becomes more important to compensate
for a lower future stock of the resource, magnifying the negative consumption
eﬀect of ρ (Proposition 4.1). When ϕ2 increases relative to ϕ1, the quality
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ratio increases, and the negative eﬀect of ρ on MUNHCH decreases:
∂2MUNHCH
∂ρ∂ϕ2
∣∣∣
α1=α2
> 0. (16)
Here, the risk of postponing harvesting decreases, dampening the negative
consumption eﬀect of an increase in ρ (Proposition 4.2). If condition (14)
holds, then the risk of less renewability is more important than the risk of
quality deterioration leading to a decrease in consumption in the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium and under the social planner. Again, the eﬀect is magniﬁed
in the social planner’s problem so, overall, the tragedy of the commons in-
creases.
5 Final Remarks
We study the economic behavior of agents who extract a common resource
when the renewability and the quality of the resource are at risk of being
altered by environmental change. In particular, we show that when the agents
engage in conservative behavior, the tragedy of the commons is exacerbated
due to strategic interactions.
In order to obtain existence of a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium, we
have relied on the Levhari-Mirman model of resource extraction with strate-
gic interactions. While this speciﬁcation may seem too restrictive,19 our
results on conservation in a non-cooperative game are consistent with the
results derived from the diﬀerent functional forms used in the literature de-
scribed in the introduction. The only diﬀerence is that we show that whether
conservation occurs or not depends on the source of risk. However, in this
aspect, our explanation is not speciﬁc to the log utility, or the Cobb-Douglas
production function, but rather due, in general, to the motivation to reduce
the exposure to risk. When risk concerns quality, a reduction in risk expo-
sure is possible by harvesting more. When risk concerns quantity, harvesting
less in order to have a buﬀer saving yields less risk. Similarly, the link be-
tween conservation and the tragedy of the commons does not depend on the
19For instance, it is unlikely that the payoﬀ from zero extraction is negative inﬁnity.
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functional form of the utility and the production functions. Rather, it is due
to the presence of strategic interaction and its eﬀect on conservation. For
instance, when there is conservation, strategic interactions induce each agent
to conserve less (relative to the social planner) because they can beneﬁt from
the conservation of the other agents.
Finally, we note that our model abstracts from two important aspects.
First, we have focused on an exogenous environmental change. Endogenizing
the probability of a climate change as in Clarke and Reed (1994), Tsur and
Zemel (1995, 1996, 1998) should a priori strengthen the result. If agents
could reduce the likelihood of the environmental risk by decreasing present
extraction, this extra conservation motive would further increase the tragedy
of the commons. Second, we have assumed that society does not display a
protection motive for the resource, i.e., there is no amenity value.20 Assuming
that the stock enters directly into preferences as in Laﬀorgue (2005) should
also alter the eﬀect of environmental risk on the tragedy of the commons.
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A Interpretation of α
In this appendix, we study the eﬀect of an increase in the Cobb-Douglas
parameter α ∈ (0, 1) on the stock of the resource. Using (2), the sign of
the derivative ∂yk/∂α indicates whether an increase in α in period 0 yields a
higher or lower stock in period k for a given path of consumption. Proposi-
tion A.1 states that an increase in α immediately and permanently decreases
the stock of the resource for any given consumption path when the initial
stock is less than the carrying capacity, i.e., y0 < 1. In other words,
∂yk
∂α
< 0
for all k ≥ 1.
Proposition A.1. Given a path of strictly positive consumption {cj,t}j=1,...,N ;t=1,2,...
and (2), for all k ≥ 1 and for y0 < 1,
∂yk
∂α
< 0. (17)
Proof. Without loss of generality, we rewrite (2) as
yt+1 = (1− ωt)α yαt , (18)
where ωt ∈ (0, 1) is a given rate of total extraction at time t.21 Using (18),
the stock of an exploited resource can be further rewritten as22
yt = y
αt
0
t−1∏
s=0
(1− ωs)αt−s. (22)
21Since
∑N
j=1 cj,t ∈ (0, yt), it follows that, for all t, there exists ωt ∈ (0, 1) such that∑N
j=1 cj,t ≡ ωtyt.
22From (18),
y1 =(y0(1− ω0))α, (19)
y2 =(y1(1− ω1))α = yα20 (1− ω0)α
2
(1− ω1)α, (20)
...
yt =y
αt
0
t−1∏
s=0
(1− ωs)αt−s . (21)
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Using (22),
∂yt
∂α
= yt
(
tαt−1 ln y0 +
t−1∑
s=0
(t− s)αt−s−1 ln(1− ωs)
)
. (23)
From (23), for y0 ∈ (0, 1), ∂yt∂α < 0 for all t > 0.
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1. We ﬁrst solve for (5). Plugging the conjecture23
V CN2 (y) = a
CN
2 ln y + b
CN
2 into (5) yields
V CN2 (y) = max
0≤ci≤y−
∑
j =i cj
ϕ2 ln ci + δα2a
CN
2 ln
(
y − ci −
∑
j =i
cj
)
+ δbCN2 .
(24)
The ﬁrst-order condition is
ϕ2
ci
=
δα2a
CN
2
y − ci −
∑N
j =i cj
. (25)
Evaluating (25) at ci = cj , ∀j = i yields
c∗CN (y) = ϕ2y/(Nϕ2 + δα2aCN2 ). (26)
Plugging (26) into (24) yields
V CN2 (y) = ϕ2 ln c
∗CN (y) + δα2aCN2 ln(y −Nc∗CN (y)) + δbCN2 (27)
= (ϕ2 + δα2a
CN
2 ) ln y + ϕ2 lnω
CN
2 + δα2a
CN
2 ln(1−NωCN2 ) + δbCN2 ,
(28)
≡ aCN2 ln y + bCN2 , (29)
23The conjecture can be inferred by solving the problem recursively as done in Levhari
and Mirman (1980). By solving recursively, one realizes that the value function is always
linear in ln y. Moreover, the limit of the solution for the t-period game as t goes to inﬁnity
is the solution to the inﬁnite-horizon game that we consider.
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where ωCN2 = ϕ2/(Nϕ2+δα2a
CN
2 ). Imposing consistency, i.e., ϕ2+δα2a
CN
2 =
aCN2 and ϕ2 lnω
CN
2 + δα2a
CN
2 ln(1−NωCN2 ) + δbCN2 = bCN2 , yields
aCN2 =
ϕ2
1− δα2 (30)
and
bCN2 =
ϕ2 lnω
CN
2 + δα2a
CN
2 ln(1−NωCN2 )
1− δ . (31)
Since both aCN2 and b
CN
2 exist, the conjecture is veriﬁed. Since the utility
and production functions are concave, the solution is unique.
We now solve for (4). Plugging the conjecture V CN1 (y) = a
CN
1 ln y + b
CN
1
and the solution V CN2 (y) = a
CN
2 ln y + b
CN
2 into (4) yields
V CN1 (y) = max
0≤ci≤y−
∑
j =i cj
ϕ1 ln ci + (1− ρ)δα1aCN1 ln
(
y − ci −
∑
j =i
cj
)
+ (1− ρ)δbCN1 + ρδα2aCN2 ln
(
y − ci −
∑
j =i
cj
)
+ ρδbCN2 . (32)
The ﬁrst-order condition is
ϕ1
ci
=
(1− ρ)δα1aCN1 + ρδα2aCN2
y − ci −
∑N
j =i cj
, (33)
where aCN2 is deﬁned by (30). Evaluating (33) at ci = cj, ∀j = i yields the
symmetric Cournot-Nash solution
gCN(y) =
ϕ1y
Nϕ1 + δ((1− ρ)α1aCN1 + ρα2aCN2 )
, (34)
where aCN1 remains to be solved. Plugging (34) into (32) yields
V CN1 (y) = (ϕ1 + (1− ρ)δα1aCN1 + ρδα2aCN2 ) ln y + κCN , (35)
≡ aCN1 ln y + bCN1 , (36)
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where
κCN = ϕ1 lnω
CN
1 +δ
(
(1− ρ)α1aCN1 + ρα2aCN2
)
ln
(
1−NωCN1
)
+(1−ρ)δbCN1 +ρδbCN2 ,
(37)
and
ωCN1 =
ϕ1
Nϕ1 + δ((1− ρ)α1aCN1 + ρα2aCN2 )
. (38)
Imposing consistency, i.e., ϕ1+ (1− ρ)δα1aCN1 + ρδα2aCN2 = aCN1 and κCN =
bCN2 , yields
aCN1 =
ϕ1 + ρδα2a
CN
2
1− (1− ρ)δα1 (39)
and
bCN1 =
ϕ1 lnω
CN
1 + δ
(
(1− ρ)α1aCN1 + ρα2aCN2
)
ln(1−NωCN1 ) + ρδbCN2
1− (1− ρ)δ ,
(40)
which veriﬁes the conjecture. Plugging (30) and (39) into (34) yields (6).
Since the utility and production functions are concave, the solution is unique.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. This proof follows the same steps as the
proof of Proposition 3.1. We provide all steps for the sake of clarity. Plugging
the conjecture V SP2 (y) = a
SP
2 ln y + b
SP
2 into (9) yields
V SP2 (y) = max
c1,...,cN
∑N
j=1
ϕ2 ln cj + δα2a
SP
2 ln
(
y −
∑N
j=1
cj
)
+ δbSP2 . (41)
The ﬁrst-order conditions are
ϕ2
ci
=
δα2a
SP
2
y − ci −
∑N
j =i cj
, i = 1, . . . , N. (42)
Solving (42) yields the symmetric solution
c∗SP (y) = ϕ2y/(Nϕ2 + δα2aSP2 ). (43)
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Plugging (43) into (41) yields
V SP2 (y) = Nϕ2 ln c
∗SP (y) + δα2aSP2 ln(y −Nc∗SP (y)) + δbSP2 (44)
= (Nϕ2 + δα2a
SP
2 ) ln y +Nϕ2 lnω
SP
2 + δα2a
SP
2 ln(1−NωSP2 ) + δbSP2 ,
(45)
≡ aSP2 ln y + bSP2 , (46)
where ωSP2 = ϕ2/(Nϕ2+δα2a
SP
2 ). Imposing consistency, i.e., Nϕ2+δα2a
SP
2 =
aSP2 and Nϕ2 lnω
SP
2 + δα2a
SP
2 ln(1−NωSP2 ) + δbSP2 = bSP2 , yields
aSP2 =
Nϕ2
1− δα2 (47)
and
bSP2 =
Nϕ2 lnω
SP
2 + δα2a
SP
2 ln(1−NωSP2 )
1− δ . (48)
Since both aSP2 and b
SP
2 exist, the conjecture is veriﬁed. Since the utility and
production functions are concave, the solution is unique.
We now solve for (8). Plugging the conjecture V SP1 (y) = a
SP
1 ln y + b
SP
1
and the solution V SP2 (y) = a
SP
2 ln y + b
SP
2 into (8) yields
V SP1 (y) = max
c1,...,cN
∑N
j=1
ϕ1 ln cj + (1− ρ)δα1aSP1 ln
(
y −
N∑
j=1
cj
)
+ (1− ρ)δbSP1 + ρδα2aSP2 ln
(
y −
N∑
j=1
cj
)
+ ρδbSP2 . (49)
The ﬁrst-order conditions are
ϕ1
ci
=
(1− ρ)δα1aSP1 + ρδα2aSP2
y − ci −
∑N
j =i cj
, i = 1, . . . , N. (50)
where aSP2 is deﬁned by (47). Solving (50) yields the symmetric solution
gSP (y) =
ϕ1y
Nϕ1 + δ((1− ρ)α1aSP1 + ρα2aSP2 )
, (51)
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where aSP1 remains to be solved. Plugging (51) into (49) yields
V SP1 (y) = (Nϕ1 + (1− ρ)δα1aSP1 + ρδα2aSP2 ) ln y + κSP , (52)
≡ aSP1 ln y + bSP1 , (53)
where
κSP = Nϕ1 lnω
SP
1 +δ
(
(1− ρ)α1aSP1 + ρα2aSP2
)
ln
(
1−NωSP1
)
+(1−ρ)δbSP1 +ρδbSP2
(54)
and
ωSP1 =
ϕ1
Nϕ1 + δ((1− ρ)α1aSP1 + ρα2aSP2 )
. (55)
Imposing consistency, i.e., ϕ1+(1−ρ)δα1aSP1 +ρδα2aSP2 = aSP1 and κSP = bSP2 ,
yields
aSP1 =
Nϕ1 + ρδα2a
SP
2
1− (1− ρ)δα1 (56)
and
bSP1 =
Nϕ1 lnω
SP
1 + δ
(
(1− ρ)α1aSP1 + ρα2aSP2
)
ln(1−NωSP1 ) + ρδbSP2
1− (1− ρ)δ ,
(57)
which veriﬁes the conjecture. Plugging (47) and (56) into (51) yields (10).
Since the utility and production functions are concave, the solution is unique.
Proof of Propositions 4.1, 4.2, 4.3. Using (6) and (10),
∂gCN(y)
∂ρ
=
ϕ1yΓ⎛
⎜⎜⎝Nϕ1 + (1− ρ)δα1ϕ1 + ρ
δα2ϕ2
1− δα2
1− (1− ρ)δα1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
2 , (58)
∂gSP (y)
∂ρ
=
ϕ1yΓ
N
⎛
⎜⎜⎝ϕ1 + (1− ρ)δα1ϕ1 + ρ
δα2ϕ2
1− δα2
1− (1− ρ)δα1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
2 , (59)
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where
Γ =
δ(1− δα1)
(
α1ϕ1
1− δα1 −
α2ϕ2
1− δα2
)
(1− (1− ρ)δα1)2 . (60)
Furthermore, from (6) and (10),
gCN(y)
gSP (y)
=
Nϕ1 +Nρ
δα2ϕ2
1 − δα2
Nϕ1 − (N − 1)(1− ρ)δα1ϕ1 + ρ δα2ϕ2
1− δα2
> 1, (61)
and
∂(gCN(y)/gSP (y))
∂ρ
=
(N − 1)(1− δα1)Nδϕ1
(
α2ϕ2
1− δα2 −
α1ϕ1
1− δα1
)
(
Nϕ1 − (N − 1)(1− ρ)δα1ϕ1 + ρ δα2ϕ2
1− δα2
)2 . (62)
Hence, from (58), (59), and (62), ∂g
CN (y)
∂ρ
< 0, ∂g
SP (y)
∂ρ
< 0, and g
CN (y)
gSP (y)
is
strictly increasing in ρ if and only if
α2ϕ2
1− δα2 >
α1ϕ1
1− δα1 , (63)
as stated in Proposition 4.3. Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 are special cases of
Proposition 4.3.
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